Lisa Bortolotti (Birmingham), who took over the editorship of Philosophical Psychology following a publication controversy in 2020, and who announced some changes to the journal last year, writes in with an update about their implementation and results. Progress at Philosophical Psychology by Lisa Bortolotti In this post we are going to update you on the progress of a philosophy journal publishing interdisciplinary research, Philosophical Psychology (Taylor and Francis), after some substantial changes implemented by the editorial team. When starting our new adventure a year ago, we aspired to make the journal more inclusive, diverse, and engaged, and to enhance the quality and efficiency of peer-review. How much progress did we make? Engagement The editorial team solicited a wider range of book reviews (we went from 3 submissions in 2021 to 22 in 2022) and also planned some symposia on topical books that will promote interdisciplinary exchange: Joseph LeDoux’s The Deep History of Ourselves (Penguin 2019), Neil Levy’s Bad Beliefs (Oxford University Press 2021), and Anneli Jefferson’s Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders? (Routledge 2022). In the editorial team’s vision, symposia and book reviews facilitate debate across disciplines and can also be of interest to the well-informed public. Taylor and Francis are fully supportive of the editorial team’s mission to increase inclusivity and engagement and will make all book reviews published in 2023 free to access for six months after they are assigned to an issue. The desire for wider engagement motivated a series of calls for papers (the CFPs on understanding bias and affordances are still open). Thanks to special issues the editorial team can encourage submissions in certain areas of interest and seek the contributions of excellent scholars belonging to underrepresented groups in the profession. Another great initiative to address bias is the launch of the Lex Academic essay prize, for the best essay on the understanding of linguistic discrimination, made possible by the generous sponsorship of Lex Academic. The deadline to submit a paper is the 28th of February, 2023. Peer review The journal experienced a steep increase in submissions of research articles (from 190 in 2021 to 290 in the first ten months of 2022) and, partly due to the growth in submissions, the journal acceptance rate for. In the following guest post, Michael Prinzing (Yale) discusses trends in philosophical discussions of happiness and well-being. Philosophy’s Happiness Literature: More of It, More Empirical by Michael Prinzing Something seems to be happening in the philosophy of happiness and well-being. Philosophers seem increasingly interested in what’s going on in the social and health sciences. Some philosophers are even conducting empirical research of their own. But is this a widespread phenomenon, or just a small subset of a sub-discipline? To investigate this question, I conducted a bibliometric analysis of articles published in the 50 most-cited philosophy journals on the topics of happiness, well-being, and the good life. (For those interested, I describe my methods at the bottom. The data and R code are available here.) Obviously, in the past 50 years or so, there has been a general trend of increasing publication volume—and not just in philosophy. That trend is illustrated by the blue line in the figure below. The blue line (scale on the right) represents the total number of papers published in the top 50 philosophy journals since the mid-20th century. Although growth leveled off a little between 1980 and 2000, there appears to have been fairly steady growth since the 1950’s. Things look very different when we turn to papers on happiness, well-being, and the good life. That trend is illustrated by the black line (scale on the left). There we see no growth at all until the turn of the millennium. At that point, the number of publications skyrocketed. Hence, this sub-discipline does seem to stand out from the general trend in philosophy. Moreover, whatever is going on in the philosophy of happiness and well-being, it seems to have started around the turn of the millennium. It’s possible that this has something to do with the rise of “Positive Psychology,” which also emerged at that time. That field of psychological research may have provided fertile ground for philosophers interested in similar topics. Or, perhaps some broader societal trend led to increased interest in happiness and well-being among both philosophers and psychologists. The second figure, below, illustrates the proportion of papers on happiness and well-being that cited scientific sources. Since there were so few publications per year during.
In the following guest post, Eric Schwitzgebel (UC Riverside) recounts what he found when, prompted by claims about how infrequently academic philosophy articles are cited, he looked at the citation rates of articles published in a few journals a decade ago. (A version of this post first appeared at his blog, The Splintered Mind.) How Often Are Philosophy Articles Actually Cited? Encouraging News by Eric Schwitzgebel You hear terrible things. You hear, for instance, that over 50% of philosophy articles are entirely uncited. You hear that the average philosophy article is cited less than 5 times. People will sometimes say things like the “median number of readers for a philosophy article is 1” or “there’s not much difference between publishing a paper and throwing it away“. Both of the last two comments appear in a recent Twitter thread launched by Helen De Cruz. It was reading this thread that inspired me to do the analyses I’ll share here. Generally my reaction to analyses and comments of this sort is to think that they are considerably underestimating how often philosophy articles are actually cited. The “big data” interdisciplinary analyses often use methods that are a terrible fit for philosophy, such as looking at citations in the past two years. (Often in philosophy it takes two years or more to write and publish an article.) Also, I wonder what counts as an “article”. If we’re including two-page book reviews, it’s little wonder that they’d be little cited, and similarly if we’re including publications in predatory or obscure journals. What would be more interesting to know—and what I think most people in this discussion really care about—is how frequently cited are full-length research articles in “respectable” mainstream philosophy journals? Before you look at my analyses, any guesses? Method I selected six representative general philosophy journals for analysis: two “top ranked” journals (Philosophical Review and Noûs), two mid-ranked journals (Canadian Journal of Philosophy and Pacific Philosophical Quarterly), and two unranked but reputable journals (Philosophia and Southern Journal of Philosophy). I then downloaded the entire table of contents of these journals from the year 2012—giving a ten-year citation window—and excluded anything that wasn’t an ordinary full-length research article (e.g., book reviews, editors’ introductions, symposium proceedings). From each journal, I randomly selected 15. The Princeton Review and Entrepreneur have again partnered to rank the top programs for studying entrepreneurship as an undergraduate.A new interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary journal, the Journal of Neurophilosophy, published its first issue this past summer. The journal “is dedicated to supporting interdisciplinary exploration of Philosophy and its relation to the nervous system” and aims to offer “critical analysis from the best of the neuroscience and philosophy literature all around the world, presented by the pioneer neuroscientists and (neuro)philosophers to help promote a better comprehension of NeuroPhilosophy.” It takes as its “most important goal” to “offer answers [to] ancient philosophical questions in the light of neuroscience with fresh, groundbreaking perspectives.” Edited by Patricia Churchland (University of California, San Diego) and Sultan Tarlacı (Üsküdar University), the open-access journal will publish not just peer-reviewed original research articles, but also opinion pieces, review articles, commentaries, book reviews, as well as articles that explain ideas of neuroscience to philosophers and ones that explain ideas of philosophy to neuroscientists. There is no submission fee. The journal aims to cover a range of topics as they relate to neurophilosophy, including cognitive science, ethics, aesthetics, free will, spirituality, quantum mechanics, biology, artificial intelligence, psychology, and more. “Neurophilosophy,” Professor Churchland writes explores the impact of discoveries in neuroscience on a range of traditional philosophical questions about the nature of the mind. This subfield aims to move forward on questions such as the nature of knowledge and learning, decision-making and choice, as well as self-control and habits, by drawing on data from the relevant sciences—not only neuroscience and clinical neurology, but also evolutionary biology, experimental psychology, behavioral economics, anthropology, and genetics. It draws also on lessons from the history of philosophy and the history of science. That’s from her “What is Neurophilosophy and How Did Neurophilosophy Get Started?” in the journal’s inaugural issue. Bringing the sciences into philosophy, she says, is a needed corrective to certain philosophical approaches: [S]ome philosophers of mind believe that they own a problem space that is concerned with conceptual necessities—necessary truths about psychological states and processes, discovered by conceptual analysis and so-called ‘thought experiments’. A necessary truth cannot, according to this approach, be falsified by scientific data. Intuitions trump data. Scientists, not surprisingly, are puzzled by where such a priori knowledge might really come from, and they do not want to be bamboozled. This is a Guest Post by my friend and colleague Logan Zeppieri. Logan holds an MA in Philosophy from Talbot School of Theology, a BA in Philosophy of.
25 Former Child Stars Who Decided To “Be Normal” And Go To College (And Who Actually Graduated)
At 18, Brooke Shields was one of the most famous people on the planet, but she put her incredibly successful career on hold to attend Princeton University because she wanted to prove she was more than just her looks.This guest post* provides some information about recent changes at two interdisciplinary journals, including one from which a previous editor resigned last year following a controversy surrounding a piece published in it. The authors are Lisa Bortolotti, professor of philosophy at the University of Birmingham, and Katrina Sifferd, professor of philosophy at Elmhurst University. Developments at Philosophical Psychology and Neuroethics by Lisa Bortolotti and Katrina Sifferd In this post we update you on some exciting developments concerning two philosophy journals publishing interdisciplinary research: Philosophical Psychology (Taylor and Francis) and Neuroethics (Springer). Lisa Bortolotti is going to take up the editorship of Philosophical Psychology from January 2022, and will tell you about the new editorial team and her aspirations for the journal. Katrina Sifferd recently joined Adrian Carter, a neuroscientist, as co-editor of Neuroethics. Katrina will talk about their newly expanded editorial team and their hopes to publish papers on a wider range of topics related to neuroethics. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY Philosophical Psychology remains committed to hosting a wide range of work at the intersection of philosophy and the psychological sciences but is getting a make-over next year, with a new editorial team, an updated editorial board, and some changes being implemented to the peer-review process. The journal considers for publication original research articles, commentaries on articles previously published in the journal, and book reviews. Lisa Bortolotti (University of Birmingham, UK) will be the new Editor and she aims to increase the quality of published outputs and provide a faster turn-around for authors, with a first decision being made within three months of submission. She will ensure that all published work is reviewed moving forward: for editorials and book reviews, peer feedback will be sought from editorial board members; for original research papers (whether solicited or unsolicited), at least two independent reviews will be sought by experts in the area. Lisa Bortolotti will be supported by four Associate Editors with complementary areas of expertise: Kengo Miyazono (Hokkaido University, Japan); Katherine Puddifoot (Durham University, UK); Anna Ciaunica (University College London, UK and University of Lisbon, Portugal); and Pablo López-Silva (University of Valparaiso, Chile). There will also be two dedicated book review editors: Mary Carman (University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa); and Lauren Saling. On September 13th, 22-year-old Mahsa Amini was arrested in Tehran by the “Guidance Patrol” or “morality police” for allegedly not wearing a hijab properly. A few days later, she died in police custody “under suspicious circumstances, due to police brutality according to witnesses.” In the weeks since, large protests have taken place across Iran and elsewhere to condemn Amini’s death, the law requiring hajibs, and violence against women. In the following guest post, Shahriar Khosravi (Texas Tech University) discusses these protests, their background and the broader political issues at stake, and their relevance to current philosophical questions. A Philosophical Note #For Mahsa: Fighting for Truth in an Epistemologically Polluted Area by Shahriar Khosravi Hijab (a head and body covering for women) has been mandatory in post-revolutionary Iran. This law is terrible, but even worse is the “morality police” in charge of enforcing it. In September 2022, Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old woman visiting Tehran with her family, was arrested for the “improper wearing” of the hijab. While in custody of the morality police, she died. The public believes that her death was owed to police brutality. Ever since, Iranians have widely protested against the Hijab Law. Groups which otherwise have conflicting interests have stuck together for Mahsa; Iran has different Ethnicities with different cultures, different economic classes, and two different (moderate and radical) political oppositions with very different ideas. These groups have all united in protesting against the Hijab Law. Interestingly, the emergence of new generations of political subjects (those who were born after 90’s) is a harbinger of a drastic paradigm shift in Iranians’ political participation. Accordingly, the presence of university students has been salient, and interestingly the increasing participation of the humanities students—including students of philosophy, sociology, literature, economics, and arts–indicates a serious change in structure of the student movements that have traditionally been led by the students of engineering and medical schools. However, the Hijab Law is not the whole story. Iran needs progressive, serious political change. Some societies need social or economic reforms. For example, India’s political atmosphere has developed sufficiently, and the country has experienced impressive rates of economic development in the last decades. Nonetheless, it seems that in absence of an effective social reform, the nation. The data shows that parents often pick traditional names for sons, but choose more experimental names for daughters. We asked experts why.
. “Philosophers, including myself, have for decades been too credulous about science, being misled by scientists’ marketing and ignoring the unavoidable uncertainties that affect the scientific process…” The following is a guest post* by Edouard Machery, Distinguished Professor in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh and Director of the university’s Center for Philosophy of Science. It is the first in a series of weekly guest posts by different authors at Daily Nous this summer. Implicit Attitudes, Science, and Philosophy by Edouard Machery How can we be responsible and savvy consumers of science, particularly when it gives us morally and politically pleasing narratives? Philosophers’ fascination with the psychology of attitudes is an object lesson. Some of the most exciting philosophy in the 21st century has been done with an eye towards philosophically significant developments in science. Social psychology has been a reliable source of insights: consider only how much ink has been spilled on situationism and virtue ethics or on Greene’s dual-process model of moral judgment and deontology. That people can have, at the same time, perhaps without being aware of it, two distinct and possibly conflicting attitudes toward the same object (a brand like Apple, an abstract idea like capitalism, an individual like Obama, or a group such as the elderly or women philosophers) is one of the most remarkable ideas to come from social psychology: in addition to the attitude we can report (usually called “explicit”), people can harbor an unconscious attitude that influences behavior automatically (their “implicit” attitude)—or so we were told. We have all grown familiar with (and perhaps now we have all grown tired of) the well-meaning liberal who unbeknownst to them harbors negative attitudes toward some minority or other: women or African Americans, for instance. While it was first discussed in the late 2000s—Tamar Gendler discussed the Implicit Association Test in her papers on aliefs and Dan Kelly, Luc Faucher, and I discussed how implicit attitudes bear on issues in the philosophy of race—this idea crystallized as an important philosophical topic through the series of conferences Implicit Bias & Philosophy, organized by Jennifer Saul in the early 2010s at Sheffield. This conference series led to two groundbreaking volumes edited. “There are many reasons to expand the story we tell about philosophy. But a main reason is just that the best, most interesting, and even the correct answers to philosophical questions that interest us might be found anywhere.” The following is a guest post* by Alexander Guerrero, Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. It is the second in a series of weekly guest posts by different authors at Daily Nous this summer. To Be a Department of Philosophy by Alexander Guerrero The profession of philosophy and the education of philosophy students—at both the undergraduate and graduate level—must change. It has now been almost exactly six years since Jay Garfield and Bryan Van Norden published their “If Philosophy Won’t Diversify, Let’s Call It What It Really Is” in the New York Times, and it has been five years since Van Norden published his follow-up book, Taking Back Philosophy: A Multicultural Manifesto. They and many others have been pointing out, for years, that the vast majority of philosophy departments in the United States (and most other parts of the Anglophone world) offer courses only from one strand of the world’s philosophical traditions, the Anglo-European strand. (And even within that strand, it is narrow, giving prominence to Ancient Greece, France, Germany, the UK, and the US.) As those of us who went through such programs know, this story begins in Ancient Greece with fragments of Thales and Parmenides and a few others, and considerably more from Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; skips forward to Medieval Europe and Anselm and Aquinas (or skips this period entirely); continues through a few prominent ‘early modern’ or ‘modern’ Anglo/European men (Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Kant, maybe also some Leibniz, Spinoza, and Rousseau); picks up a few others in the 19th Century (Bentham, Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx, Mill); and arrives with an early 20th century philosophy origin story that goes through Frege, Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein and into central figures like Quine, Kripke, Lewis, Rawls; and then a topically-driven focus on many distinct philosophers in the last quarter of the 20th Century and early 21st Century on the analytic side (substitute Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Derrida, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze, Foucault, etc., on the continental side). The dominant version of the story includes no. Suppose the main aim of the enterprise of academic philosophy is to generate philosophical knowledge, and that said knowledge is mainly answers to big philosophical questions. How should the discipline be organized so as to best achieve this aim? The supposition is not unusual.* In his “Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy?” David Chalmers (NYU) writes: I suspect that for the majority of philosophers, the primary motivation in doing philosophy is to figure out the truth about the relevant subject areas: What is the relation between mind and body? What is the nature of reality and how can we know about it? Certainly this is the primary motivation in my own case… At least pretheoretically, many of us get into philosophy looking for truth and looking for answers. If answering its big questions is what philosophy is mainly about, could we say that our current institutions and professional practices are ideally suited to the task? (Beware status quo bias!) If not, then what should answer-seeking philosophical institutions and practices look like? How people answer this question may depend on how feasible they think their answers must be. On the conservative end of the feasibility spectrum, one might take the question to be asking, “Which other disciplines, if any, should we take as models for philosophy, and how?” That’s one way to interpret the question, and answers to that version are welcome. But it might also be instructive to relax the feasibility restrictions quite a bit, and try to imagine arrangements very different from the status quo, or arrangments heretofore untried but that seem possibly promising. Perhaps we could, for instance, wrangle small but feasible steps for reform from some wildly unrealistic grand visions. We might also learn more about what we think of the aim of philosophy through this exercise. A bold and convincing suggestion for re-organizing philosophy might itself overcome one’s skepticism about philosophy aiming for convergence on answers to big philosophical questions by revealing such skepticism to be a function of philosophy’s current mode of institutionalization. Or one might discover that what would be required for organizing philosophy optimally towards answering its questions is so unappealing as to prompt reconsideration of the worthiness of that aim. So, philosophers,.
Are today’s younger philosophers “focusing too much on detailed investigations of individual things and not enough on the big picture”? In the following guest post*, Joshua Knobe, professor of philosophy, linguistics, and psychology at Yale University, argues they’re not. (An earlier version of this post first appeared at The New X-Phi Blog.) In Defense of the Details by Joshua Knobe Talking with other philosophers from my generation, I often encounter a certain amount of dissatisfaction about what has been going on within the younger generation in certain areas (language, mind, epistemology, philosophy of science). I don’t share this dissatisfaction, and I thought maybe I should say a little bit about why. Broadly speaking, the usual worry is that “kids today” are focusing too much on detailed investigations of individual things and not enough on the big picture. Caricaturing somewhat, the thought is that a typical Gen X grad student in the philosophy of language would have been working on something like “the nature of meaning,” while a typical Gen Z grad student is working on something more like “free choice inferences involving disjunctions under epistemic modals.” Similarly, the typical Gen X student in the philosophy of science would have been working on something like “the nature of scientific theories,” while the typical Gen Z grad student is working on something more like “the application of causal Bayes nets to time series data.” It is hard to deny that certain areas of philosophy have changed in precisely that direction, but I don’t agree that this change is something we should regret. To see why, we need to introduce an important distinction. The distinction is between (a) the amount of words people are writing about the big picture issues and (b) the degree to which people are finding important truths about the big picture issues. It might well be the case that philosophers these days are writing fewer words that are directly about the big picture issues, but in my view, the things philosophers are doing now are actually teaching us more about those very issues. As one illustration, let’s consider the way things have changed over time in the study of folk-psychological concepts. I choose this specific example just because I happen to. At the start of each term, Helena de Bres (Wellesley) holds “get to know you” office hours with her students. “So what made you sign up for a philosophy class?” she asks. “We read Beyond Good and Evil in our AP English class,” Taylor replies. “In my senior year I did an independent study on Albert Camus,” Jada announces. “I discovered Kierkegaard when I was sixteen and it changed my life,” Ying explains. “Wonderful!” I say. Then I wonder how long it will take this time to crush their hopes and dreams. In the second installment of her series for The Point on academic philosophy and the meaning of life (the first is here), Professor de Bres questions whether the division of labor that characterizes contemporary analytic philosophy—the “normal science” of different philosophers each working on their narrow questions—can give anyone the wisdom philosophy is supposed to be the love of, particularly if, in addition to being focused on a particular specialization, analytic philosophers in their work are supposed to keep their own emotions, hopes, and fears “firmly out of view,” and avoid “features of language important to atmosphere, mood and enjoyment… for fear of muddying the message or conveying superficiality.” She writes: As you practice the analytic method, with that attitude, and in that style, you become adept at distinguishing at a very fine grain between different possible theses, and noticing the various ways in which they might be arranged in relation to each other to form arguments for or against highly circumscribed and abstract positions. It’s an interesting thing to do with your mind, but what’s it for? What’s the big picture? How does it help us approach our limited and fraught time here on the planet? Bad questions! The proper response to “What’s your philosophy of life?” is to snort, raise your eyebrows at your colleagues and get back to responding to Reviewer 2. By contrast, “the rest of humanity doesn’t feel fenced in by disciplinary restrictions when asking big human questions.” Concerns like this are sometimes raised by people who think that the worst thing to have happened to philosophy is that it was institutionalized within universities. I don’t think this is the view of Professor de Bres (we will. “I need to have the humility to recognize that, in this case, I have not found that truth, and that I may not ever find it. And it has also shown me that I need to be more generous to people who are dumbfounded by cases where I happen to have clear and consistent intuitions.” The following is a guest post* by Louise Antony, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. It is the fourth in a series of weekly guest posts by different authors at Daily Nous this summer. Moral Dumbfounding and Philosophical Humility by Louise Antony A few weeks ago, at an excellent conference on the epistemology of religion at Rutgers University, I had a terrific conversation with John Pittard. I had mentioned to him, in an offhand way, that my overall reaction to best-of-all-possible-world theodicies was this: if the creation of our universe really necessitated the amount of suffering experienced by sentient creatures on this earth, then God would have had a moral obligation not to create it at all. John then posed the following case to me: Suppose that you knew of a planet, very much like Earth, that was in the very earliest stages of the evolution of life, with maybe just some microbes, but with no lifeforms even close to sentient. Suppose, further, that it was possible for you to figure out—from its extreme similarity to Earth at the same age—that in all probability, sentient life would evolve, much as it did on Earth. Finally, suppose that you were in a position to destroy the planet before any further evolution occurred. Would you be morally permitted to do it? Would you do it? It struck me that, given the principle implicit in my view of theodicies, it was pretty obvious I ought to say that I was not only permitted, but even obliged to destroy the planet. After all, I had committed myself to the view that the amount and intensity of suffering that has transpired on Earth is sufficient to have made the creation of the world morally wrong; oughtn’t I to prevent such suffering if I were able to? And yet, surprisingly, I found myself quite reluctant to say that I.
Lauener Prizes in Philosophy Awarded
The Lauener Foundation for Analytical Philosophy last week awarded its two prizes. At a ceremony held at Haus der Universität, Bern, Switzerland on Thursday, the foundation awarded its 2022 Prize for an Outstanding Oeuvre in Analytical Philosophy to Susan Wolf, Edna J. Koury Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Professor Wolf works mainly in ethics, including the meaning of life, love, freedom and moral responsibility, and other related subjects. It also awarded its 2022 Prize for Up-and-Coming Philosophers to Matthieu Queloz, Junior Research Fellow at Wolfson College and a Member of the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Oxford. Dr. Queloz works in metaphilosophy, epistemology, metaethics, the theory of action, and the history of philosophy from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. The Lauener Prizes are awarded biennially to “highlight exemplary contemporary philosophical oeuvres, and… encourage and support young talent to consistently break new ground in analytical philosophy.” They include a cash prize (the Foundation did not yet respond to requests for details on the amount). The Lauener Foundation was created in 2003 in accordance with the will of Henri Lauener, who was professor emeritus of analytical philosophy at the University of Bern. Previous winners of the prizes are listed here.The National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) has announced the winners of its latest round of grants, and several philosophers are among the winners. They and their funded projects are: Todd Buras (Baylor University) (w/ co-project directors Phillip Donnelly and Angel Parham) Disputatio and the Pursuit of Wisdom in the Humanities A two-week summer seminar for schoolteachers exploring the disputatio, or disputed questions, as a tool for discussing the nature of wisdom. ($189,999 / Institutes for K–12 Educators) Landon D. C. Elkind (Western Kentucky University) Principia Mathematica: A Critical Edition Preparation for publication of a critical edition in print and digital formats of Principia Mathematica (1910–1913) by British philosophers Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970). ($281,104 / Scholarly Editions and Translations) Juan Carlos Flores (University of Detroit Mercy) A Critical Edition of Henry of Ghent’s Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum, Articles 73–75 Preparation for print and digital publication of 13th-century philosopher Henry of Ghent’s Questiones ordinariae (Summa), articles 73-75. ($295,528 / [Scholarly Editions and Translations) You can access the full list of recent NEH grant winners here. . “Civilization collapse [is] the loss of societal capacity to maintain essential governance functions, especially maintaining security, the rule of law, and the provision of basic necessities such as food and water. Civilization collapses in this sense could be associated with civil strife, violence, and widespread scarcity, and thus have extremely adverse effects on human welfare.” That’s Daniel Steel (UBC), C. Tyler DesRoches (Arizona State), and Kian Mintz-Woo (Cork), writing in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), a prestigious science journal. In their “Climate Change and the Threat to Civilization,” they describe different civilization collapse scenarios resulting from global warming and call for more scientific research about them. The scenarious range from “local collapse” in which “climate change causes collapse in specific, vulnerable locations while civilization elsewhere is largely able to adapt to climate impacts’ (though “local collapses can contribute to political instability in non-collapsed places”) to “global collapse” in which “all large urban areas across the globe are virtually abandoned, functioning nation states no longer exist, and the world’s population undergoes a significant decline.” The authors note that “discussions of mechanisms whereby climate change might cause the collapse of current civilizations has mostly been the province of journalists, philosophers, novelists, and filmmakers,” and call for scientists to get more involved. Specifically: First, we suggest that more scientific effort be devoted to studying socio-climate feedback and exogenous shock vulnerability climate collapse mechanisms. Among other things, this involves greater attention to pathways whereby direct climate impacts might interact with social, economic, and political factors to threaten societal collapse. Second, collapse mechanisms should be systematically examined in tandem with causal processes involved in successful adaptation to environmental challenges as well as economic forces and policies that could drive a green transition. Consideration of the complex interplay of social, environmental, and other factors as well as the active role of societal resilience is already well established in historical and archeological research on collapse. The challenge is to bring the study of mechanisms that might cause the collapse of current civilization up to that standard of scientific rigor. Their hope is that “careful scientific study of climate collapse might act as a counterweight to discussions of climate collapse that are sensationalistic or biased towards portending. . Psychology is one of the most popular college majors for good reasons. Read on for nine reasons you should major in psychology.
. Catarina Dutilh Novaes, professor and university research chair in the Department of Philosophy at VU Amsterdam, is the winner of the 2022 Lakatos Award. The Lakatos Award, named in memory of philosopher Imre Lakatos, is awarded in recognition of a monograph in the philosophy of science broadly construed, either single authored or co-authored, published in English. The award is endowed by the Latsis Foundation and administered by an international committee organized by, but independent of, the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Professor Dutilh Novaes won the award for her book, The Dialogical Roots of Deduction (Cambridge University Press, 2020). According to the prize announcement, The Dialogical Roots of Deduction is praised by the Selectors as a “masterwork” that is “absolutely fascinating” and in which “we have a breath-taking amount of knowledge revealed”: “the knowledge is breath-taking, the argument original, and the whole is an intellectual feat”. The book “develops a coherent, compelling and broadly articulated account of large parts of human reasoning that has wide relevance to understanding science as a particular development of human reason.” The book offers a “very intriguing, erudite, and potentially highly productive argument, namely that deduction is fundamentally a dialogical and collaborative phenomenon, and hence is not the outcome of individual activities based on rules or logic with reasoners in competition with each other, but instead should be viewed as a social activity.” In making this point, “the book clearly makes a very important contribution to our understandings of logic and mathematical reasoning”. The Lakatos Award includes a prize of £10,000 (approximately $12,500) and the delivery of a lecture at the LSE. Previous winners of the award are listed here.Philosophers, have you considered trying to get a job in a business school? In the following guest post*, Kenneth Silver, who earned his PhD in philosophy from the University of Southern California and is now assistant professor in business ethics at the Trinity Business School at Trinity College Dublin, explains why you might want to, and how to do it. Why and How to Get a Job in a Business School: A Guide for Philosophers by Kenneth Silver If you’re a PhD student in Philosophy today, then you know how competitive the academic job market is for jobs in Philosophy departments. Let me pitch to you why you should consider trying to get a job in a business school, then lay out some steps to do this that I wish I had known. Why? A significant reason to try to get a job in a business school is that, with some maneuvering, it’s a goal that you might stand a decent (or at least a better) chance of achieving. Consider my experience. With a dissertation in the metaphysics of action from one of the top programs, and with eventually about five or six publications, I received almost no interviews over three years on the philosophy job market. In contrast, within business schools and management departments, I came close to getting two very nice postdocs, had three skype interviews for one three-year and two permanent positions, and had a separate flyout and subsequent job offer. This is anecdotal, but I’ll note two points: First, you might look better for philosophy jobs than I did. I had only managed to get into good philosophy journals, not the best ones. And, in hindsight, my work was not as significant as the work of some of my peers. So, if you are publishing impactful work at the highest level as a graduate student, then pat yourself on the back, stop reading, and get back to it! The second point to make is that you might also not look as bad for a job in a business school as you may think. Five years into my doctorate, I can promise you that I did not look like someone who could get a job in a.